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Book Reviews 
An Uncertain Tradition: Constitutionalism and the History of the South. 
Edited by Kermit L. Hall and James W. Ely, Jr. (Athens: University 
of Georgia Press, 1989. Pp. ix, 403. Tables, notes, select bibliography, 
index. $40.00 cloth, $17.95 paper.) 
Comparisons across time or space are merely incomplete casual 
explanations, small descriptive steps on the path to analysis, histo- 
rians' conventional rhetorical substitutes for more comprehensive 
empirical generalizations. If the South has had a legal "legacy of 
ambivalence," if its "spokesmen frequently sought to be in the federal 
constitution order without being of it" (p. 6), as Kermit Hall and 
James Ely assert in their introduction to this collection of essays from 
a 1987 symposium, just what produced that ambivalence, assuming, 
as the editors do implicitly, that the South was more mentally divided 
than the North was? If courts in colonial Virginia were clerk-domi- 
nated, locally-oriented, and concerned overwhelmingly with proce- 
dures, not substance, as David König contends in the chronologically 
earliest essay in this volume, how, precisely, does that colony's experi- 
ence compare to that of others, or of Virginia later, and what factors 
explain the variations? If eleven of the fifteen states that failed to 
ratify the Equal Rights Amendment were southern, as Mary Bonsteel 
Tachau points out in a stimulating, if necessarily skeletal essay on the 
largely unexplored topic of southern women's legal history, what ac- 
counts for the greater degree of opposition to women's rights in the 
South? How, if at all, do the causes of these contrasts relate to slavery, 
segregation, fundamentalist Protestantism, climate, modes of produc- 
tion, "culture," or whatever? 
The authors of these thirteen essays, which vary perhaps even 
more than usual for a melange volume in quality, originality, and 
scope, do not expend much effort on pinpointing causes. Indeed, like 
most historians, they seemingly do not recognize the lack of logical 
closure in their accounts. Most extreme is Herman Belz's reactionary 
polemic, "The South and the American Constitution," which 
homogenizes the histories of both sections as well as experiences 
within the South, viewing patently contradictory philosophies as 
legitimate outgrowths of a "republican" tradition so amorphous that 
it can equally foster states' rights and centralism, slavery and antislav- 
ery, autocracy and freedom of expression, antipartyism and party 
consciousness, or segregation and equal rights. Distorting the work 
of other scholars, including myself, in order to read the civil rights 
movement and affirmative action out of the southern tradition and 
the proslavery and segregation movements into the national 
mainstream, Belz eschews explanations by denying that real differ- 
ences between North and South, and within the South, existed. 
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Other contributors contradict Belz and each other without men- 
tioning the fact or saying why they differ. For William Wiecek, unlike 
Belz, the necessity of defending slavery and racial discrimination pro- 
duced a distinctive southern constitutionalism, and the revolutionary 
northern effort o reconstruct southern society after the Civil War 
(not slavery or the civil rights movement) gave rise to a southern 
tradition of extralegal violence. Although Wiecek believes the use of 
states' rights arguments by antebellum southerners "opportunistic" 
(p. 169), Paul Finkelman, in a subtle, sectionally comparative ssay on 
the subject, specifically denies that it was (p. 125). And whereas 
Wiecek emphasizes the distinctively "southern" features of the Con- 
federate constitution (pp. 172-73), Donald Nieman, in a closely fo- 
cused and nuanced paper, stresses the continuity of that document 
with the national "republican" tradition and with the experiences of 
both sections in antebellum and even postbellum politics. How can 
historians hope to advance toward agreed-upon generalizations if the 
authors of papers delivered at a single conference, published in the 
same volume, refuse to confront each others' descriptions or explana- 
tions, and if they fail to move from metaphors, such as continuity, to 
explicit models of causation? 
Other contributors' pioneering observations raise causal questions 
that they do not attempt to answer. Why did South Carolina, but not 
other American colonies, require of its attorneys attendance at the 
English Inns of Court, as Herbert A. Johnson asserts that it did (p. 
92)? Why did the transition from colony to state make so little differ- 
ence in South Carolina (p. 98)? Why did post-Reconstruction state 
constitutions, North as well as South, adopt the tenets of "laissez-faire 
constitutionalism," if Michael Les Benedict is correct in saying that 
they did? Was federal appeals court judge John J. Parker's moderate 
regionalist economic jurisprudence of the 1920s and '30s followed by 
enough other courts to form "a judge-made southern constitutional 
tradition" (p. 278), as Peter Graham Fish believes? If so, how and why 
did that tradition differ from those of other sections? 
With the exception of the late antebellum period, the legal history 
of the South is not far advanced. The narrowly-focused descriptions, 
thinly-based overviews, and question-filled xplorations that make up 
this volume are probably inevitable at this stage of research. But as 
studies of the subject proliferate, historians should become more self- 
conscious in framing explanations. 
J. Morgan Kousser 
California Institute of Technology 
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